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Sixteen years have passed since the Charter of the United Nations
was drafted at the San Francisco Conference. Sixteen years after the
Versailles treaty, the League of Nations was on the verge of facing,
and failing to meet, its biggest challenge: an evaluation written in the
summer of 1935 would have been, on the whole, a positive one. Thus,
any assessment of the United Nations' contribution to contemporary
world order has to be cautious and provisional.
At any given time, the kind of order which exists in the world
depends on the nature of the international system; the methods and
the rules by which a minimum of security, assent and flexibility is in-
sured depend on the structure of the world, on the domestic political
systems, on the trans-national forces and on the scope and means which
characterize the relations between the actors on the international
scene.' Before 1919, world order consisted of two main elements:
on the one hand, the legal norms which tried to delimit the rights and
duties of the states and to regulate their competition or their coopera-
tion in various areas; on the other hand, the empirical rules of behav-
ior which resulted from the distribution of forces, from the calculations
and strategies of the states, for instance, the "laws" of the balance of
power system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The creation
of an international organization was supposed to bring a drastic change
into world politics and world order. It was intended to close the gap
which had so often appeared between the legal order and the empirical
one. At the same time, the legal order was becoming far more ambi-
tious: international law would stop being the reflection of power rela-
tions which left sovereignty intact or submitted the sovereignty of a
given state merely to those restrictions which were imposed by the
greater force of its combined enemies. International law would become
instead a body of rules determining the conduct of states independently
from power relations and curbing the essential attribute of sovereignty,
the right to resort freely to violence. International organization would
be the motor of this new law. The world was assumed to be capable,
so to speak, of leaping from Hume to Kant.
The drama of both the League and the United Nations has re-
sided in one basic ambiguity and in one deep abyss. The ambiguity
is that of the very concept of international organization.2 It is a
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1 For further elaboration, see the author's "International Systems and International
Law," to be published in World Politics (October 1961).
2 See Walter Schiffer, The Legal Community of Mankind (New York, 1954).
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fictitious community; it represents no revolution in the structure of
the world. The basic unit remains the state, but in order to be able
to play an effective role in discharging such functions as the mainte-
nance of peace, the settlement of disputes, the emancipation of non-
self-governing territories, the protection of human rights or the pro-
motion of economic cooperation, the organization should dispose of
some real political power over the states, i.e., enjoy a modicum of au-
tonomy and supremacy. In reality, however, decisions within the or-
ganization are made by the states. Hence a contradiction: the basis
of action and obligation is supposed to be an emergent community
spirit, as if the states were no more than agents of this international
community, as if the organization expressed a general will no longer
divided into separate and antagonistic wills, no longer confiscated by
governments. But the reality of action is precisely one of governmental
interests, which remain most frequently divergent and which, even
when they converge on the organization, tend to use it as an instru-
ment, and to exploit the community fiction for their own purposes.
Consequently, the efficiency and authority of the organization depend
ultimately, not on its Charter, but on the state of the world outside.
But it is here that we find an abyss opening under the organization.
After 1919 and after 1945 there has been a tremendous difference be-
tween the kind of world which was supposed to be the starting point, the
condition and the milieu of the organization's functioning, and the
world which had emerged from a global war. Versailles did not create
a world of satisfied nation-states and of safe democracies, in which
public opinion operating freely across borders, and statesmen who
recognize as a new international legitimacy the dogmas of open diplo-
macy and world parliamentarism would serve as trans-national
forces. Now, the organization is unable to create through its own
power the reality which the founders of the Organization had failed
to deliver.
In the case of the League, it proved to be impossible to overcome
the ambiguity and to bridge the abyss. Obviously, the deeper the lat-
ter, the stronger the former. But the paradox of the United Nations
until now is that despite that abyss, the organization has been able to
survive. Although totally different from the world envisaged at San
Francisco, the post-war international system has, so to speak, found
various uses for the United Nations; consequently, the role the United
Nations plays has little in common with the role an international or-
ganization was supposed to play, in the grandiose Wilsonian design
for a new world order: it is a more modest but far less utopian task
and therefore the basic ambiguity, which, as we will see, is of course
still there, is less destructive. I would like to examine first how and
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to what extent the United Nations has been able to adapt to the post-
war world despite the abyss I mentioned, and secondly, what are the
uses of the organization in the present international system.
Ii
1. In the case of the League of Nations, it became clear only
gradually that the main authors of the Covenant did not agree on
what they expected from the organization, and that the post-war
world fitted the expectations of none of them. It took just a few months
to make it clear that the world in which the United Nations was oper-
ating had no resemblance with the world envisaged by the men who
made the Charter.
The world envisaged by them was full of complexities and contra-
dictions. It was assumed, in the first place, that tho Big Five would
remain responsible for the maintenance of peace and act as a new
Concert (but no longer restricted to Europe) in charge of security;
hence, the well-known provisions of Chapter VII and the theory of
the chain of events, the extension of the principle of unanimity to ad-
missions and amendments. In the second place, the Charter embodied
also another inheritance from the nineteenth century, but this one was
a product of that very liberal utopia of international relations which
had opposed the practices of the European Concert, and whose victory
over those practices Wilson had tried to insure in the Covenant of
the League. It was the expectation that major disputes between states
would, on the whole, be few and limited. The solemn assertion of a
very broad "domestic jurisdiction" principle showed that one still be-
lieved that domestic affairs and international ones could be kept sep-
arate. Another distinction was made between breaches of peace or
threats to peace, and less explosive disputes. It was assumed that a
hierarchy could be maintained, and that the lesser disputes could
ordinarily be solved by traditional diplomatic techniques. In the third
place, the Charter provisions on economic and social matters and the
statutes of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund postu-
lated a world which, after a brief period of reconstruction, would no
longer be plagued by permanent financial difficulties (balance of pay-
ment troubles being primarily solved by domestic efforts), in which
economic development would be assured mainly by private investors
at ordinary conditions of security and profit, and in which quantitative
restrictions and discriminatory measures would be gradually removed
from world trade.
One can defend those postulates by saying that they were not at
all utopian, but realistic in the sense of defining the only conditions in
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which an international organization can properly function.3 Whereas
the egalitarianism of the League had a utopian flavor, the Charter at
least recognized that the success of an organization which is not a
super-state depends on the existence of a concert of great powers which
will be the driving force within and the mechanism thanks to which
the world outside will be made such that an international organization
has some chance of playing a useful role. As for the liberal concep-
tion of international relations which coexisted with the new Concert,
did it not simply express the idea that an organization which is not
a super-state can be effective only as long as not every dispute which
it handles is a matter of life and death for some of its members? When
such a matter arises, it is the Concert of the Big Five which must deal
with it (and the Security Council was indeed made capable of over-
coming the domestic jurisdiction clause in the case of Chapter VII).
But one must assume that the organization will not have to live in
the climate of tragedy all the time, for, indeed, the more often such a
climate takes over, the smaller are the chances of great power soli-
darity. However, if this was realism, it belonged to the category which
Raymond Aron has called "wrong realism"-the mistake which results
from a misinterpretation of reality rather than from idealistic illusions.4
The United Nations was launched in a world torn by the conflict be-
tween East and West, by the storm of decolonization, and by the quest
for development.
2. The history of the Organization, and especially the history
of what happened to its Charter, is that of a race, the race of the
United Nations to escape from the consequences of the contrast be-
tween the world postulated by the Charter and the real world. Because
of this contrast, the Organization was faced with the risk of a triple
paralysis. First, the conflict between East and West was threatening
not only to destroy the collective security function and apparatus, but
also to cripple the procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes
by the Security Council. The race away from deadlock took the well-
known form of a transfer of power to the General Assembly: on the
one hand, more and more ordinary disputes and situations were brought
before it, under art. 11, par. 2; on the other hand, the Uniting-for-
Peace revolution of 1950, voted during the Korean crisis, constituted
a daring attempt at shifting responsibility for collective security from
the Security Council to the General Assembly, unburdened by the veto.
Secondly, the violence of most of the disputes which broke out in the
3 See I.L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (2d ed., New York, 1959), Chapters 4
and 8.
4 Raymond Aron, "En quote d'une philosophie de la politique 6trang~re," III Revue
Francaise de Science Politique, 69-91.
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post-war world, particularly between colonial powers and their colo-
nies and protectorates or between the new states, was such that too
faithful an observance of the careful tags with which the Charter tried
to define a hierarchy of conflicts, and too persistent a respect of the
prohibition against intervention in domestic affairs, would have con-
demned the organization to permanent frustration. The race, here, led
on the one hand to an implicit or explicit rejection of the exception of
domestic jurisdiction whenever a state invoked it in a case where its
domestic troubles had serious international repercussions, and on the
other hand to a discarding of the labels of the Charter by the Security
Council and by the General Assembly. Ad hoc procedures were sub-
stituted for explicit references to such and such an article. Conse-
quently, instead of the cautious and gradual diplomatic methods of
Chapter VI, the Organization has resorted to a far more energetic
"policy of presence" and to collective intervention. Thirdly, the kind
of massive irrelevance to post-war economic problems other than the
reconstruction of western Europe, which seemed to be the fate of the
United Nations and of its agencies, was avoided by a determined
switch of attention to problems of technical assistance and economic
development.
This triple race away from paralysis presents two aspects which
are worth noting. First, in order to justify practices which were so
thoroughly at variance with its original Charter, the Organization had
to accentuate, rather than overcome, the fundamental ambiguity I
have described: it has interpreted its Charter as if this document
were the equivalent of a national constitution, whose provisions fre-
quently lose their old meaning or receive a new interpretation, without
any formal amendment, but through the practices of governmental
organs and thanks to the underlying political consensus. The trouble
is, of course, that the international milieu is not a community yet, but
the trend toward behaving as if it had, in Mr. Hammerskj6ld's vocab-
ulary, passed from the stage of an "institutional pattern of coexistence"
to that of a "constitutional system of international cooperation,"'' is
nowhere more clear than in the role played by the Secretary General.
Both Mr. Lie and Mr. Hammerskjild-the former with excessive
gusto, and the latter despite his initial reluctance-have acted not
merely as administrators in charge of a secretariat, nor even as trustees
discharging the functions which heavy and clumsy political organs can-
not perform efficiently, but as leaders speaking for that international
interest or community whose "existence" justifies the twisting of the
Charter. It is precisely when the normal interplay of states' clashing
5 Address by Mr. Hammerskj~ld at the University of Chicago Law School, 6
United Nations Review No. 12 (June 1960), 26-30.
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policies threatens to reduce the Organization to impotence, that the
Secretary General becomes the organ of continuity and "fills the vacu-
um" by taking an initiative.6
Secondly, the postulates on which the re-interpretation of the
Charter is based describe a world which is the exact opposite of
the world assumed by the original postulates, but whose "realism" is
just as questionable. On the one hand, it is now assumed that the
conflict between the big powers should not prevent the exercise of col-
lective security even against one of them, and indeed, in the practice
of the United Nations, collective security has been set in motion only
in the Korean case, and the only nations condemned as aggressors
have been Red China and the Soviet Union! Breaches of peace which
do not pit East against West have been handled with methods stronger
than those envisaged by Chapter VI, but far less drastic than those of
Chapter VII. On the other hand, it is also assumed that the very
scope of the disputes between old and new states, or between the new
ones-disputes in which the old barrier between domestic and interna-
tional affairs collapses, and in which force is almost always used-
makes collective intervention by the Organization not only desirable
but likely to succeed.
3. Precisely because those new assumptions are of dubious
validity, the outcome of the race has been most ambiguous. It is easy
to point out that the Organization has been unable to eliminate all
those factors of present-day world politics which resisted its attempts
at asserting its role; but it is also easy to show that the Organization
has nevertheless survived and played a remarkable part.
In many ways, the race looks like a circular circuit rather than a
straight run away from the pitfalls of the Charter. The postulate of
the need for big-power unity seems largely vindicated; whenever there
has been a direct clash between East and West, the role of the Organ-
ization has been limited. The fact of "bipolarity" has been stronger
than the machinery of "Uniting for Peace," collective security has been
tacitly abandoned as a function of the United Nations,7 and the pro-
cedure of resorting to an emergency session of the General Assembly
when the Security Council is paralyzed has been used, not in order to
organize collective security against a large or even a small power (ex-
6 See for instance the Secretary General's statement at the opening meeting of the
General Assembly's third emergency special session on August 8, 1958, his initiatives
in the Congo crisis in July 1960 and again in February 1961. Throughout the summer
of 1960, the resolutions submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon to the Security Council on
the Congo followed the suggestions spelled out by the Secretary General in his state-
ments or reports.
7 See I.L. Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of Force," 532 International
Conciliation (March 1961).
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cept during the Korean war), but as a way of restoring peace or solv-
ing disputes without resort to coercion, after a failure of the Security
Council. Even when the issue at stake was not a direct clash between
East and West, one major condition of United Nations' success in
restoring peace or in reaching a settlement has been at least a tacit
concert of the Big Two. The postulate according to which the Organ-
ization would be most effective if the majority of disputes were not
too violent or too deep has also been largely vindicated: the United
Nations has dealt with countless conflicts in which the international
status or the domestic regime of nations was involved, but it has re-
peatedly failed to reach a substantive settlement. The expansion of
the technical assistance program, the switch in the lending policies of
the World Bank-from Europe to the rest of the world-the creation
of the International Finance Corporation and the International Devel-
opment Association do not amount to a massive transfer of aid from
bilateral to United Nations channels. The "haves" remain reluctant
to abandon control of their funds. Various short-circuits such as the
fiasco of the International Trade Organization or the failure to stabil-
ize the price of primary products or the resistance to SUNFED have
marked the limits of United Nations action in this area.
The lesson is clear: legal impotence has been overcome, political
limitations have not been removed. The failure to influence the Soviet
Union or China in cases such as Hungary and Tibet, not to mention
disarmament; the inability to solve the issues of Kashmir or the Arab-
Israeli conflict, as well as the difficulties of the United Nations opera-
tion in the Congo; the slowness of the process of erosion by which the
underdeveloped countries try to squeeze more money for capital devel-
opment from the richer nations: all those facts show how deep an abyss
there remains between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be
in order to allow the United Nations to play the major role which both
its founders and their successors wanted. Consequently, the basic am-
biguity of international organization cannot fail to appear as a per-
sistent obstacle; the world community has rarely looked more ficti-
tious. In an area such as Laos, in which East and West clash directly,
the "United Nations presence" established by the Secretary General
was bound to evaporate; in the Congo crisis, there have been moments
when the deadlock between conflicting camps-East and West, mod-
erates and radicals among the new nations-was such that any at-
tempt at pursuing a "United Nations policy" became both an exercise
in fiction and a peril for the Secretary General. Indeed, in so far as
this ambiguity is both summed up in, and revealed by, the Secretary
General's role and fate, nothing is more discouraging for the believers
in an international community than the destruction of one Secretary
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by the brutal attacks from the Soviet Union (which followed degrad-
ing pressures of United States witchhunters) and the threats to the
position of the other Secretary which come both from the Eastern bloc
and from certain new nations whose policies conflict with the "inter-
national interest" as defined by Mr. Hammerskjtild.
However, despite such unfavorable circumstances, the Organiza-
tion has done far more than survive. The contrast with the League
in this respect is most remarkable. The Covenant was gradually emas-
culated, and when the "time of troubles" came, the nations' reactions
were centrifugal. On the contrary, the United Nations has emerged
as one of the most interesting aspects of contemporary international
relations. The Organization has become indispensable as a result of a
double process. On the one hand, each camp needs the United Nations
as a field of manoeuvre; in this respect, the United Nations is neither
a substitute for traditional diplomacy nor the beginning of a world
community, but the form of multilateral diplomacy which corresponds
to the extension of the international system to the whole world. The
cold war involves not only an attempt by each bloc to preserve its
own forces and, if possible, to weaken the adversary. One of its main
stakes is the allegiance of the new and underdeveloped nations; con-
sequently, it becomes necessary for both East and West to be present
in the United Nations, which provides them with unprecedented possi-
bilities of influence and mobilization. Even if the Organization cannot
directly affect the "core area" held by each superpower, it can exert a
more subtle action on the balance of power in the area of the "third
world." The revolution against colonialism operates with a similar
dialectic; here, the very divisions among the major powers (and not
only between East and West) give an advantage to the smaller na-
tions and incite them to exploit to the hilt an organization which those
divisions put under their numerical control. Similarly, in the battle
for economic development, the needy nations use the Organization as a
lever against the richer ones and the latter dare not protest too much
because it is precisely for the support of those poorer nations that
they compete. Thus, there is a convergence of conflicting interests on
the Organization as an arena of major importance. On the other hand,
there are areas in which the Organization is useful not merely as an
instrument to be used by each group in the international competition
but as an institution necessary to all members because of identical or
convergent interests in joint action. In such cases the United Nations
is more than an arena, it is a force. Thus, the United Nations con-
tributes to the establishment of a new world order in two distinct ways.
First, it is the framework in which the nations hammer out many (al-
though, as we have noticed and shall see again, by no means all) of
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the empirical rules of behavior and of the legal norms which are sup-
posed to prevent the present international system from resembling the
war of all against all. Secondly, it is one (and only one) of the ele-
ments of stability and order in the present world.
III
Thus, the role of the United Nations in the present international
system is double. The Organization reflects the system; but it also
affects it-both negatively and positively.
1. Precisely because the United Nations, since 1955, has opened
its doors to almost all states, the Organization is a very faithful mirror
of post-war world politics. It shows both the disastrous and the hope-
ful sides. Let us examine the disastrous aspects first. The present
international system is a revolutionary one. As such, it presents two
characteristics which account for many of the United Nations' own
features. In the first place, it is a heterogeneous system. The diplo-
matic field embraces the whole world for the first time, but there are
huge differences: (1) between states, both from the viewpoint of power
(contrast between the states that dispose of a capacity of general de-
struction, and the others) and from the viewpoint of authority (dif-
ference between well-established states, and new nations, sometimes
in search of their proper borders); (2) between political regimes, both
from the viewpoint of the domestic formula of legitimacy and from
that of economic policy; (3) between levels of economic development;
(4) between ideological camps. Those factors of heterogeneity are
felt in United Nations debates on practically any subject, whether the
Organization discusses the future of colonialism or tries to draft cove-
nants on human rights or attempts to intervene in the endlessly com-
plicated disarmament dialogue which has been going on among the
superpowers. The United Nations mirrors both the universal but super-
ficial adherence of 'all states to the principles of conduct expressed in
the Charter, and the reality of negative solidarities which link members
of blocs or groups and divide the world into contending factions.
In the second place, a revolutionary system is one in which the
relations between states are no longer marked by any moderation in
scope or means. The end of moderation in scope entails the following
developments. On the one hand, the violence of the competition be-
tween states brings about the collapse of the zone of domestic affairs
and of the principle of non-intervention; the choice of a regime de-
termines the international conduct of a state and each major contender
tries to influence the choices of lesser ones. United Nations' discussions
on the French Cameroons in 1959, and even more the debates on the
Congo, have reflected this aspect: not only is the United Nations' oper-
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ation in the Congo caught in the contests between Congolese leaders,
but various groups of states fight for the recognition of antagonistic
leaders. On the other hand, in a revolutionary period, "functional"
sectors previously removed from the political struggle and left to the
free activities of private citizens become once again stakes in the strug-
gles of the states: consequently, not only has the sphere of international
economic affairs become one of the main battlefields, but even more
technical subjects have been affected with a political interest. United
Nations' discussions on economic development or on the right to na-
tionalize natural resources have reflected this extension of world poli-
tics, while many of the specialized agencies were faced with the di-
lemma of eliminating from their agenda controversial issues in order
to stay out of politics-but at the cost of irrelevance-or else facing
the storm, but at the risk of possible deadlock. As for the end of
moderation in means, it entails in particular the unlimited resort to
techniques of propaganda and subversion against the enemy camp or
in order to obtain the allegiance of third parties; it also entails the
willingness to use force in order to wrest local gains and the determi-
nation to exploit fully the temporary advantages one may enjoy in
the technological race. A list of the problems discussed by the United
Nations shows that this is indeed what has kept the organization so
busy, despite all the restraints which the principles of the Charter
were supposed to impose on the behavior of the members. But this is
also what makes agreement on the international control of atomic en-
ergy, or on reserving outer space for peaceful uses, impossible to
obtain.
By definition, a revolutionary system is one in which world order
is almost non-existent; and to the extent to which the United Nations
has been a mirror of the system, it has been permanently threatened
with paralysis. The United Nations translates into parliamentary terms
the fundamental divisions of the world. The danger of paralysis has
even augmented over time. Thus, the more membership has increased,
the more difficult it has become to obtain a two-thirds majority in the
General Assembly; the outcome of debate is often either no resolution
at all, or a compromise version which verges on the meaningless.'
Similarly, the United Nations has suffered not only from the fact of
the cold war between East and West, but also from its evolution.
Soviet tactics have switched, after Stalin's death, from an essentially
defensive attitude, reflected in Russian behavior and arguments in
8 See for instance, during the 14th session of the General Assembly, the failure to
adopt a resolution on Algeria; during the 15th session, the failure of the resolution
proposing sanctions against the Union of South Africa because of apartheid, and the
compromise resolution on Algeria.
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the United Nations, to a much more daring strategy which adds to the
continued defense of the integrity of the Soviet bloc a determined
effort to win over uncommitted nations, or at least to exasperate their
antagonism toward the West. The fifteenth session of the General
Assembly has been particularly spectacular in this respect. The effect
of this change on the United Nations has been a faithful reflection of
the effect in the world. It has meant not so much a net addition to
the strength of the Soviet bloc, as a loss of influence for the United
States (which finds it far more difficult to get its own viewpoint adopted
by two thirds of the members, must more and more frequently leave
the initiative to the uncommitted nations, and merely tries to soften
or weaken their suggestions) and an increasingly deep split between
moderates and radicals among the uncommitted nations.
This shift in Soviet tactics poses a very serious problem for the
United Nations. Until recently, the organization's efficiency in political
matters was limited by two main obstacles: the "impenetrability" of
the Soviet bloc, which became sufficiently recognized so that issues
like Tibet or Berlin were either barely discussed or avoided altogether,
and the rockbottom obstacle which stops any international organiza-
tion, i.e., the unwillingness of any state to accept a substantive settle-
ment of a dispute which goes against its interests. Here, the United
Nations merely reflected the contradiction between the extension of
the diplomatic field and the maintenance (and mushrooming) of sep-
arate sovereignties. Those obstacles were serious enough, for they
contributed to the reluctance of UN members to allow the establish-
ment of a permanent non-fighting force. Many states feared that it
might be used either in an East-West dispute, thus endangering world
peace, or against their own interests, should a conflict involving them
arise. However, in between those limits there remained the area de-
scribed by the Secretary General in his report to the fifteenth Assem-
bly: "Keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differ-
ences,"9 filling the power vacuum between those blocs whenever a
conflict breaks out there, so as to prevent them from rushing in. This
was feasible as long as both superpowers tacitly agreed on the need for
"decolonization" or on the way of handling the crises which this process
provoked. But if each superpower tries to affect the process in such
a way that the outcome will be a "friendly" new state, the dream of
the UN filling the gap becomes the nightmare of the UN turned into
a battlefield. The contrast between the Suez and Congo crises indi-
cates the extent of the deterioration. In the Suez crisis, the UN was
able to act without too many difficulties because of a joint pressure
9 7 United Nations Review No. 4 (Oct. 1960) 24.
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from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. toward a restoration of the status quo,
and because of the support of most "uncommitted" nations for such
a policy. Consequently, the Secretary-General was able to act as the
"executive" of the Assembly, which gave him massive political back-
ing. In the case of the Congo, the superpowers agreed only on one
thing, the need for Belgian withdrawal,' but each one chose his own
favorite among the contending leaders, and the Afro-Asian nations
split and chose sides as well; consequently, from October 1960 to
February 1961, the Secretary General, far from filling any vacuum,
was left on his tightrope walking above a political vacuum, as was
shown in most spectacular fashion by the failure of both the Security
Council and the General Assembly to adopt any resolution at all in
December. The long race from the Security Council to the General
Assembly, from the Assembly to the Secretary, seemed to have ended
in fiasco. The lesson is clear-the UN can escape from total paralysis
only to the extent to which, in the sphere considered to be the proper
UN sphere of action by the Secretary General, the states that belong
to neither bloc are able to reconcile their differences and to resist the
pulls and pushes of both blocs.
Is this possible? The answer is yes. Here we must turn to a far
more positive side of the picture. The present revolutionary system
contains one fundamental element of stability-the fear of total war.
The very uncertainty which marks the danger of "escalation" has
acted as a dampener on limited wars as well. Consequently the con-
test between the two blocs, including the competition for allegiance of
the other nations, is primarily a non-military one and each superpower
tries to seduce or subvert, but not to conquer or coerce. Two chances
open therefore for the United Nations. First, the amount of arm-twist-
ing which each superpower can do at the expense of the smaller nations
is limited, and the United Nations reflects the desire of the latter to
preserve their independence from outside encroachments, wherever
they may come from, just as much as it reflects the blocs' efforts to
penetrate this independence. Whatever their ambiguity, the resolu-
tions adopted by the Security Council in February 1961 and by the
General Assembly two months later, concerning the Congo, as well
as the resolution adopted by the Assembly's emergency session on
August 21, 1958, concerning the Middle Eastern crisis, show the re-
straints which the need to gain consent imposes on the superpowers.
The failure of the Soviet plan to "reorganize" the Secretariat indicates
the same thing. Secondly, the fear of general war re-enforces the desire
of all states, and particularly of those which have the weapons of gen-
10 Even on this point the two states have disagreed about the speed with which
it should take place and the scope it should have.
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eral destruction, to "keep talking." Negotiations may be fruitless, but
the dialogue must be maintained and the UN provides an ideal forum
for such a dialogue. But we are here at the limit between the United
Nations' role as a mirror and its role as an actor.
2. Every contemporary development toward world order has
two faces; one which threatens chaos, one which promises order. There
is a negative contribution by the United Nations which tends too often
to be submerged behind pious expressions of faith or gallant efforts
at presenting what may well be inevitable as being actually beneficial.
It results from the fundamental ambiguity which was mentioned in
the beginning. It expresses itself in three ways.
There is, first, a contradiction between the realities of interna-
tional politics and the fictions which the UN seeks to preserve in order
to be able to operate. Now, any resort to fictions conceals a weakness
and multiplies difficulties. One such fiction is the principle of equality,
according to which each member has one vote. Equality symbolizes
the idea of homogeneity, but as we know, the members represented
in the UN are neither equal in power nor homogeneous from any point
of view. The idea of homogeneity and the dream of community com-
bine in producing "majoritarianism"--the belief that the resolutions
adopted by two thirds of the members really represent the opinion of
mankind. Another fiction, which has gotten the Organization into all
kinds of trouble, is that of non-intervention. We have seen that the
UN has actually reversed the hierarchy established by the Charter, and
rejected the exception of domestic jurisdiction invoked by a member
whenever there was an international interest attached to the matter.
But the principle of non-intervention is one to which each member
clings for himself, and which the UN must proclaim in its own opera-
tions; it was supposed to be the guideline of its action in the Congo.
Unfortunately, the revolutionary character of world politics has played
havoc with the principle. In a situation of quasi-civil war, non-inter-
vention can only mean staying out completely; once one goes in, it
becomes almost meaningless. Indeed, in the Congo crisis, the myth
of non-intervention has had three effects: it has managed to infuriate
in turn each of the Congolese factions, which interpreted the "neutral-
ity" of UNOC as an act of hostility. It has obliged the Secretary Gen-
eral and the members to resort to highly debatable devices in order
to justify intervention while preserving the dogma of non-interference
in domestic affairs: thus, the idea that what makes UN intervention
necessary, and what explains the crisis, is the persistence of Belgian
intervention, or-at the time when Mr. Hammerskji5ld's antagonism
with Mr. Lumumba was at its most heated-the distinction between
internal political conflicts, which were "off-limits," and "flagrant vio-
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lations of elementary human rights," which had to be stopped." Fi-
nally, the myth of non-intervention itself collapsed, when the Security
Council adopted a resolution asking for reorganization of the Congo-
lese army. The main trouble with the resort to fictions is that they
increase the resistance of minorities; a state or a faction which objects
to a UN resolution finds in the lack of realism of the organization a
good reason to stick to its guns. In a world where states are not equal,
where they have no obligation to obey, and no way of being obliged
to obey resolutions adopted by UN majorities, and where domestic
and international problems are intertwined, the UN exposes itself to
failure either when it tries to bully a reluctant state (be it a Commu-
nist state like Russia, a colonial power like Portugal, a racist country
like South Africa, or the industrial nations which have been resisting
SUNFED) or when it pretends to respect a principle which will merely
give to the pygmies some rope with which they can bind Gulliver.
Secondly, there is a contradiction between the nature of the prob-
lems submitted to the Organization and the way in which they are
handled by it. On the one hand, there is an excessive fixation on pro-
cedure: the emphasis is put less on the methods by which the issue
could be solved, even less on the substance of a solution, than on the
measurement of "international public opinion" as represented by the
delegates. In other words, the UN tends to indulge in "barometrics"
rather than in diplomacy. This is a by-product of the transfer of power
to the General Assembly, but the practice of inviting "interested"
states which are not members of the Security Council to come and
present their views generalizes this development. Hence huge amounts
of time are spent on finding the right words or the right sponsors. It
is a search for the degree of indignation, concern or exhortation which
will make the machine tilt-I mean, obtain the necessary two-thirds
majority. Much of the criticism of parliamentary diplomacy is unfair;
the length and heaviness of debate and its inevitable propaganda as-
pects should not make one forget that there is as much negotiation
going on behind the scenes as there is posturing on the rostrum. What
is seriously disturbing, however, is that so many of the secret discus-
sions and deals in the lobbies are concerned not with action, but with
wording-with symbols rather than substance. On the other hand,
when the Organization in emergencies resolves to act, there is another
kind of fixation. The extinction of fires, I mean the end of the use of
force, seems to be the ideal and the goal; it is, of course, a fine and
noble task, especially in a world in which "escalation" and general em-
broilment are permanent threats. But there is a formalism in this
11 Statement by the Secretary General to the Security Council, 7 United Nations
Review No. 4, 47 (Oct. 1960).
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approach, which is not without its own peril. 2 Groups or nations
often resort to force because it is the last avenue which remains open
to them for the redress of a grievance or because underlying problems
have received no solution. The United Nations, by putting so much
more energy into the admittedly more spectacular act of rushing to
smother the flames than into the difficult task of rebuilding the charred
house, tends to leave too many cinders smoldering in the ashes. This
was the weakness of UN action during the Suez crisis. The handling
of the Congo emergency has shown a tendency to concentrate once
more on the avoidance of "military solutions"; it was made inevitable
both by the danger of foreign military intervention at the request of
the various contending factions, and by the difficulty of recognizing
openly that the cause of the drama was the lack of preparation of the
Congolese for independence and the absence of any Congo-wide na-
tionalism. However, as long as the source of the trouble remains
hidden, the Organization has no choice but to see the domestic political
struggles continue, the peril or the reality of outside military help re-
sume, the lack of competent Congolese administrators and technicians
persist, and its own forces treated as a party to the conflicts without
disposing of all the means a party ordinarily can use. A policy of
presence with limited authority may bring about the worst of all
worlds. This contradiction between the nature of the problems and
the UN approach tends to aggravate matters, to the extent to which
attention is diverted from what is fundamental to what is merely an
effect, and often from what is relevant to what is not. In particular,
the concentration on the evil of force incites nations either to shift
their strategy from outright violence to subtler forms of intervention
(which may go unnoticed or be handled far less energetically by the
UN) or else to provoke new explosions after the problems which led
to previous ones have remained unsolved long enough.
There is a third contradiction, this time between the stakes of
political conflicts in the world and the means at the disposal of the
Organization. Those means are extremely limited: small sums of
money, either for the regular budget, or for economic programs, or for
special operations such as UNEF and UNOC, sums which are obtained
only after painful debates, and at the cost of heavy arrears or defec-
tions; then, there are mechanisms such as emergency forces, observers,
committees of conciliation or investigation, mediators and special rep-
resentatives; finally, there are resolutions, pure and simple. As we
have seen, there is no collective security machinery, the organs which
the Uniting-for-Peace resolution was supposed to establish have faded
12 See P~re R. Bosc, "Ideologies et Institutions de 'O.N.U. depuis 1945," Revue de
rAction Populaire No. 147 (April 1961), 403-14.
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away, and the emergency forces themselves are doubly limited by the
principle of consent of the host and by the freedom of withdrawal of
the participants. The result is that the UN impact on world affairs
remains necessarily limited. The UN does not reach domestic opinion,
does not affect the choice of a regime, the selection of alliances, the
military policies of the main powers. Attempts to handle vital prob-
lems with insufficient means may aggravate international troubles in
two ways. On the one hand, whenever the UN hits (deliberately or
accidentally) a vital interest of a state, and in particular whenever the
UN seems to threaten what a nation considers to be its very fabric or
its essential values-in other words, the image the citizens have of
their nation-the reaction is bound to be violent and bitter: French
attitudes toward the UN because of Algeria, South African refusals to
cooperate with UN Committees, Portugal's walk-out over Angola are
only the more extreme examples. The total fiasco of UN action in
the field of human rights, i.e., the most sensitive area of governments'
relations with their citizens, points to the same moral. On the other
hand, the contrast between stakes and means tends to weaken the UN
as an instrument for the solution of disputes and thus to reduce the
effectiveness of one of the few elements of order available in the
present international system. Thus, the presence of 20,000 men
in the Congo looks at times like the attempt of a few shipwrecked
passengers on a raft trying to stop a storm. Coping with interventions
from abroad, and with civil war and political turmoil within, is simply
too much for an expeditionary force which far from being able to seal
off hermetically the Congo from the outside world, must suffer the
consequences of decisions taken elsewhere-for instance in Casa-
blanca-or in the Congo itself-for instance in Matad. The force
which was supposed to act as a buffer is too weak to be effective; and
the other two contradictions-the myth of non-intervention, the fixa-
tion on force-added to the present one tend to perpetuate the crisis,
even if only in softened form. One may well ask if an endless, if
muted, terror, is better than a terrible end-or will prevent it ulti-
mately.
3. The more positive effects of the UN on the international sys-
tem are, however, far from negligible. The organization contributes to
a transformation of three aspects of the system.
In the first place, the Organization has a double impact on the
structure of the world. On the one hand, there is a subtle action on
the international hierarchy, one might almost call it a gradual sub-
version. The effect of "bipolarity" on the hierarchy is in many ways
neutralized, i.e., the super-powers, far from possessing an influence
proportional to their potential (specially their military potential) are
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obliged to let smaller powers enjoy greater freedom of action than in
many periods of history. Two qualifying remarks must be made.
First, the UN does not "destroy" the international hierarchy, not only
because it does not have the means to do so, but also because it has
shown, in its treatment of states on which the Organization wanted to
put pressure, a healthy respect for differences in power, i.e., small states
have been dealt with far less cautiously than either the Soviet Union
(even in the Hungarian case), or the United States (see the resolu-
tion of April 22, 1961 on Cuba), or even the United Kingdom and
France. Secondly, what prevents the superpowers from playing toward
the small nations a role corresponding to their overwhelming might is
primarily the double factor I have singled out before, the desire to
avoid general war, and the resulting reliance on persuasion or sub-
version rather than violence for the recruitment of clients and friends.
This is the fundamental cause which explains why, in the international
hierarchy of today, sheer military strength is less decisive than it has
been in the past. The very destructiveness of the nuclear arsenal,
which gives to the superpowers a superiority great powers never had
before, also tends to neutralize this advantage as long as a war has
not started.
However, the UN has not only benefited from this singularity,
it has exploited and enlarged it. The transfer of power to the General
Assembly has given to the weaker states a splendid opportunity to
push their advantage to the hilt, and they have used it. In the UN,
because of their number, they can even thwart the designs of
the superpowers. The debate on the Congo has shown for instance
that the very violence of Soviet attacks on the UN operation has
brought the African and Asian nations close enough together to allow
them to compromise for the preservation of UNOC, and both the
Soviet Union and the United States, despite their objections to various
provisions, had to follow. As Mr. Hammerskild put it recently, "the
United Nations has increasingly become the main platform-and the
main protector of the interests-of those many nations who feel them-
selves strong as members of the international family but who are weak
in isolation. Thus, an increasing number of nations have come to look
to the UN for leadership and support in ways somewhat different from
those natural in the light of traditional diplomacy. They look to the
Organization as a spokesman and as an agent for principles which give
them strength in an international concert in which other voices can
mobilize all the weight of armed force, wealth, an historical role and
that influence which is the other side of a special responsibility for
peace and security."'1 3 It is precisely this role of the UN as a counter-
13 7 United Nations Review No. 4, 27 (Oct. 1960).
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vailing force that corrects the effects of the traditional hierarchy, to
which a statesman like General de Gaulle objects so strongly, for he
is attached to the classical formula of a directory of the great powers.
Paradoxically, such a directory was more powerful in the League, de-
spite a very egalitarian Covenant, than in the UN, despite a hierarchi-
cal Charter. Thus, each small state sees in the UN the one forum in
which it not only "is somebody," but in which it is able to make its
presence felt. Furthermore, in so far as the processes of parliamentary
diplomacy resemble those of any parliamentary system marked by a
multiplicity of factions and consequently by great difficulty at reach-
ing compromises, certain small states gain considerable prestige and
influence by playing a key role as brokers and conciliators, due not to
their own strength but to their political position. They are the "friends
of all parties," the truly non-aligned states, which play the role which
isolated but centrally located and skillful personalities played in the
Parliament of France's Third Republic, for instance, Ireland, Sweden,
Tunisia, and often Canada and Yugoslavia. 4
On the other hand, the UN influences the structure of the world
by accelerating the increase in the number of states. The very prestige
conferred by membership in the UN, and the opportunities for influ-
ence which are thus opened, are factors which confirm many national-
ist leaders in their desire to press not only for full-fledged independ-
ence rather than mere internal autonomy within a crumbling empire,
but also against mergers between newly independent nations. Further-
more, the Organization's own interpretation of its powers under Chap-
ter XI, its very strict supervision of political developments in trustee-
ship territories, its attacks on colonialism both in separate instances
of trouble and as a matter of principle, have made of the UN a matrix
of new states.
Both aspects of this action on the structure of the world tend to
strengthen the basic ambiguity of international organization, for there
is a sharp contrast between the "community" symbolized by the UN
(with its predominance of the smaller nations and its collective drive
for independence from colonial rule) and the outside world, in which
the superpowers remain the leaders and in which the increase in the
number of states only multiplies the prospects for disputes and crises,
consequently undermining whatever community there may be. What
matters here, however, is that the UN does more than reflect this am-
biguity, which may well condemn it to impotence at frequent intervals,
it is one of its chief architects.
In the second place, the Organization affects the means at the
disposal of the states in their relations. The role of the UN in this
14 See Sidney D. Bailey, The General Assembly, Ch. 2 (London, 1960).
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respect consists of fostering at least a partial return to moderation.
It has been felt in three areas. First, there is the area of the one
identical aim of all states, the avoidance of general war and the desire
to see even limited conflicts purged of violence because of the danger
of extension. There, the UN has not been able to affect the super-
powers directly, despite pleas for the suspension of nuclear tests and
for disarmament, but it has skillfully handled the "limited war" in
Korea-except for the blunder of crossing the 38th parallel in Oct.
1950 without sufficient awareness of the consequences-and it has
developed numerous techniques, put up various kinds of alarm bells to
prevent clashes between smaller nations or within a smaller nation
from becoming trial grounds for a direct East-West clash. The tacit
consent of both superpowers in this respect-a negative concert which
does not prevent either from trying to affect the outcome of the dispute
as long as resort to force is avoided or maintained at a low level-
has been continuous. French and British evacuation of Egypt in
1956, U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1958, and the Soviet retreat
from the Congo after the fall of Lumumba have been possible
not only because of the fear of war but also because the UN provided
both a guarantee against excessive loss of face and a fairly impartial
mechanism for removing the element of violence-without prejudging
the result of the contest. This is the area in which the Secretary
General has played a vital role, and acted as the representative of the
one identical purpose of all segments of mankind.
A second aspect of this action of the UN corresponds to con-
vergent interests of the various members, i.e., the setting up of instru-
ments for technical and administrative assistance as well as the ex-
pansion of channels for multilateral economic aid. The logic of the
competition has forced not only the West to retreat from its hostility
and to concede that a sizable portion of its aid should be granted
through the UN (although the risk of giving too much control to the
recipients is an unpleasant one) but also the East to abandon its initial
refusal to participate at all. The desire of the underdeveloped coun-
tries for aid devoid of the political strings or implications of bilateral
agreements has conversely forced them to accept, in the case of loans
from the World Bank, more of a check on their own plans than they
often might have wished. The results remain limited, but the partial
convergence of competing interests on common channels is definitely
an element of stability, whereas the separate channels of bilateral and
regional agreements perpetuate the centrifugal elements of the present
international system. In this area, it is the Secretariat whose role
must be underlined.
A third aspect of the stabilizing role of the UN is more contro-
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versial: in the parts of the world which are not under the control of
the Soviet Union, the United Nations has made it almost impossible
for the stronger states to employ toward the lesser ones the more
brutal means of coercion traditionally used; this is a result of, both,
the fear of general war and the increased role of small powers within
the United Nations. The best example was the Suez affair. It is a
doubly controversial "improvement" of world politics. The Soviet
bloc feels under no compulsion to observe similar restraints, and the
outcry against a "double standard" of UN action arises quite legiti-
mately. This abandonment of gunboat diplomacy also has its hypo-
critical aspects, since it does not prevent bigger powers from trying to
impose their will on lesser ones by methods of subversion. Neverthe-
less there is here a partial contribution to a partial world order, and
it must be taken into account as one of the consequences of the exist-
ence of the Organization.
In the third place, the UN has an impact on the trans-national
forces that cut across borders. The action of the UN in this respect is
twofold. On the one hand, the Organization reenforces those "sepa-
ratist" solidarities which bind various nations into groups or blocs.
Those entities are usually created outside the UN, but once again the
world organization is more than just a mirror, it is a catalyst and an
accelerator. It is easier to meet in the lobbies of the UN than in Accra
or Bandung. The blocs or groups are, with the exception of the Soviet
one, anything but united. Recent votes on Algeria or on the Congo reveal
for instance a three-way split among the Afro-Asians. 5 But the fact is
that the basic negotiating unit tends to become the bloc, that drafts are
discussed first by each caucus, and that deals between groups take
place only at a later stage, after a common stand has been thrashed
out within each of the principal groups, or after attempts at achieving
unity within them have failed. 6 The very fact that most of the major
issues of international politics are brought before the UN and to a
vote obliges groups which would otherwise remain vague associations
of states with ideological affinities, to react in a way which either
consolidates their solidarity, or decisively shows that it was fictitious.
15 The Pakistani resolution on the Congo, adopted by the General Assembly on
April 15, 1961, received the support of 12 African and 12 Asian states (in addition to
Turkey); 7 African states voted against it; 6 African and 8 Asian states abstained. The
paragraph of the resolution on Algeria which decided the organization of a referendum
by the United Nations was supported by 27 African and Asian states, rejected by 11
African ones, while 5 Asian ones abstained. The resolution as a whole was supported by
31 African and Asian states and opposed by 6 African states, while 7 abstained. The
resolution asking for sanctions against South Africa was supported by 23 African and
7 Asian nations and opposed by one Asian state; 13 Asian and 1 African state abstained.
16 See Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, 1958).
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It will be interesting to see, in this respect, to what extent a sub-group
of the Afro-Asian group such as the French-speaking African one is
just a transition from the former Community to totally different align-
ments, or to what extent on the contrary it is a genuine bloc. The UN,
in which such groups rub against one another, puts them to a kind of
test of truth which would probably operate much more slowly if the
Organization did not exist.
Partial and often divisive solidarities are however not the only
ones which the UN consolidates. The Organization also strengthens
the germs of universalist tendencies which can be detected in the
present world. Thus, the UN crystallizes elements of a new interna-
tional legitimacy which are still weak and questionable but which
might otherwise get lost altogether in the turmoil of separate inter-
pretations and calculations. The origin of those elements is double.
There is first of all the internationalization of European principles-
those of the old Liberal ethos of international relations-as was shown,
for instance, by the Bandung provisions on coexistence. They simply
reflect the fact that the vision of a world of harmonious nation-states
uncoerced by superior power is a kind of common denominator in a
universe where nationalism still spreads. Secondly, there is this fear
of war and the resulting restraint on the competition for allegiance
which I have mentioned. What results is a kind of consensus on prin-
ciples such as the avoidance of force, the need for an international
presence in emergencies, the right to self-determination and the right
to economic development. Needless to say, the balance sheet is mixed;
not only does the Soviet bloc have its peculiar interpretation of each
of those principles, but, as we have seen, there is not any of them
which does not have its own limitations, drawbacks or dangers. How-
ever, there has never been any international legitimacy without in-
equities or flaws, and the role of the UN consists precisely of trying
to put some flesh on those bones-for there can be no international
legitimacy without a minimum of performance.
The United Nations tries to strengthen these principles not only
by promoting common actions, but also by fostering a process of what
I have elsewhere called "political mobilization," or a gradual leveling
of concern.17 The UN accelerates the effects of the extension of the
diplomatic field to the whole world, by obliging all its members to
take stands on all questions, thus bringing home to an unprecedented
degree the idea that what concerns one part of the planet may affect
all the others. The UN is unable to achieve "one world" in the sense
of an orderly and unified system for collective security, the settlement
17 "National Attitudes and International Order: the National Studies on Inter-
national Organization," XIII International Organization 202.
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of disputes, etc.; such a system requires a unity, or an overwhelm-
ing convergence, of national attitudes and responses. But at least
the UN tries to bring about the prerequisite, "one world," in the sense
of universality of concerns. This is precisely the area in which the
League of Nations, with its de facto predominance of the Council, its
essentially European aspect, and even more its link with the status
quo of the peace treaties, had failed most dismally.
IV
Ambiguity has been the key of our assessment of UN history and
of UN action. It remains at the center of any projection one may try
to make into the future.
If we look at the general trend of UN action in the world, it
becomes almost too easy to denounce the Organization as the second
most powerful force of disruption of the status quo, next to Commu-
nism. The break-up of Empires, approval of measures of economic
nationalism which hit mainly Western interests, a majority of anti-
status quo nations which obliges the West to choose between ineffec-
tive and unpopular opposition, and giving its blessing to resolutions
which weaken its positions further-all those aspects of the role of the
UN may give serious worry to statesmen who fear that the only
beneficiaries of disruption will ultimately be the Communists. On the
other hand, we must not forget that the assault on the status quo
which is thus being waged is in many ways a conservative revolution,
inspired by slogans and principles which belong to the Western, and
particularly to the Liberal heritage. If the cry for political and eco-
nomic self-determination and the desire for welfare and development
provide Communism with admirable opportunities and turn more often
than not against the West in the present phase, they may at a future
date provide in reverse the West with opportunities and serve as bar-
riers against Communist imperialism. The UN merely accelerates a
liquidation of the status quo which would proceed anyhow; the degree
to which this should mean a liquidation of the West depends on the
West's reactions far more than on UN actions.'"
If we look at potential UN contributions to a new world order,
we must realize first that such an order will still be based on the state
as the main unit, and consequently that order will be possible only if
conditions of stability are resolved in the international system. Now,
for such a restoration we cannot count on material developments (for
they may tend to accentuate the competition), on general common
18 On this point see Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign
Policy (Boston, 1960) and the author's "Sisyphus and the avalanche: the United Nations,
Egypt and Hungary," XI International Organization, 464-9.
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principles (for they may be interpreted in conflicting ways), or even
on what Raymond Aron calls the dawn of universal history (for there
are violently divergent manners of living the same history)." We can-
not count on legal prescriptions, for international law loses much of
its authority in revolutionary systems. We cannot count on the UN
to maintain or establish such conditions of stability as an equilibrium
of power between the major states (for the Organization has no re-
sponsibility in preserving the balance of terror and no way of check-
ing nuclear diffusion) or a return to the limited state in domestic re-
gimes, or an end of the ideological clash between East and West.
But a restoration of stability presupposes also a return to moderation
in the scope and means of international relations and it is here that
the UN becomes important. Moderation in scope would necessitate
both the end of the cold war, and improved political and economic
relations between the western powers and the newly independent states.
Moderation in means would require a strengthening of the measures
taken to prevent the outbreak of general war or of wars which could
degenerate into global conflicts. The end of the cold war is beyond the
possibilities of anyone at this time; but on the other two issues, despite
the persistence of the cold war which interferes with a reconciliation
of "North" and "South" and makes agreements on disarmament or
even arms control unlikely, the United Nations has a major role to
play. It is not an exclusive role, but it is a crucial one precisely be-
cause the Organization is the only agency which includes almost all
states and symbolizes, in its weaknesses as well as in its strengths, the
idea of a universal world order. Nothing is more important therefore
than to avoid wasting United Nations' efforts on areas where failure
is guaranteed; nothing is more important than to exert leadership so
that in the two areas where constructive action is possible, the United
Nations do indeed contribute to world order, rather than fail to act
altogether, or even act to increase tensions further2 0
19 Dimensions de la Conscience historique, Ch. VIII (Paris, 1961).
20 For recent evaluations of the UN, see Erich Hula, "The UN in crisis 27 Social
Research, 387-420, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "UN on trial," 39 Foreign Affairs,
388-415.
